...in my life:
So...after a few weeks of cold-hearted resignation, my original internship appears to be working out after all. Assuming everything goes to plan (ha!) it starts in ten days in Washington, D.C. I need 400 hours for my degree requirement and--due to the delay--I have approximately 40 working days to do it in. You do the math. Basically, this blog is likely to go dormant until September. But take heart, dear readers. Come the fall I will likely revive this blog (maybe with a new name?), unless I end up not being able to afford my last year of grad school, in which case I will definitely revive it.
In the meantime, I highly recommend al-Jazeera English as your primary means of staying abreast of developments in the Arab world. Unless you want to know about Qatar.
About Me
- BJ
- I had plans for a super-awesome summer internship involving Middle East policy. Those plans went kaput, but I've decided to do what I'd be doing anyway, for personal edification and satisfaction. And fame, obviously.
Thursday, June 23, 2011
Monday, June 20, 2011
Bashar al-Assad's Three Kinds of Protesters
Today in Damascus, Syria's president-for-life Bashar al-Assad delivered his first official address in two months, broadcast live via state media and international outlets like BBC Arabic. His words were simply fascinating, and I've spent the morning on Youtube looking for the whole speech (part 1 of BBC Arabic coverage uploaded to Youtube) and reactions from various camps (political camps and refugee camps in Turkey).
You can get a fairly comprehensive look at the speech from this al-Jazeera English article (Arabic counterpart here). Al-Assad acknowledged that there are some protesters with legitimate concerns. But he also said there are 64,000 lawless vandals and a third group composed of "radical and blasphemous intellectuals." Even though he conceded the presence of peaceful protesters, there's no reason to believe the supposed presence of elements from the other two groups won't continue to be used as an excuse for the military to conduct armed assaults on civilian targets. Al-Assad also has not abandoned the claim that "outside elements" are instigating the violent conflict inside Syria.
Al-Assad promised to address the grievances of peaceful protesters. I think al-Assad is going to make up relatively minor grievances and "fix" them as an attempt to regain some legitimacy. For instance, he reiterated his pledge to pardon some of those involved in the protests. Um...it's not like people initially started protesting to demand the pardon of protest participants (though many protesters do want to see an end to arbitrary arrests). If al-Assad really wanted to introduce reform aimed at quelling the violence, he'd announce the cessation of arbitrary arrests altogether, instead of vague promises about going easy on those protesting for the past three months.
As another component of his "reform" plan, al-Assad seems to be taking a page out of King Abdullah's book, calling for national dialogue committees of a total of about 100 people to discuss the country's problems and brainstorm solutions. In Jordan, some people dismissed the committee as illegitimate, claiming that since the government convened the committee, it could not be free and independent in its recommendations. I suspect that will be the same case with Syria--with each committee member hand-picked as a "safe choice" and each recommendation reviewed by the regime for approval.
Another disappointing sign was al-Assad's repeated call for "a return"--"a return to a normal way of life," the return of the army to its barracks, the return of Syria to tranquility and "freedom"... basically, a return to exactly how things were before the protests began.
Perhaps the most stunning example of al-Assad's denial was at the very beginning of the speech, when he said, among other interesting blessings, "Peace be upon every mother who lost a loved one, and on every child who lost a parent." As if that blood is not on his hands, in large part.
That's largely how Syrian audiences in the Turkish refugee camps--the easiest Syrian audience for international media to reach--reacted. Most seemed to react to al-Assad's call for them to return to Syria with contempt and suspicion.
Still, not all Syrians have abandoned the president, and despite reports of defections, the military seems to be holding together well enough with their tanks and automatic weapons against the onslaught of civilians armed with protest signs and rocks.
In other Syria-related news, Russian president Dmitri Medvedev clarified his country's position on the crisis, reiterating that Russia will use its veto to defeat any UN resolution on Syria similar to Resolution 1973, which many feel NATO abused to enter into military involvement in Libya. According to this al-Jazeera Arabic article, "he placed moral responsibility for the civilian casualties on the Syrian regime" but went on to say that "he believes Damascus's promises of reform." That makes one of us, I guess.
You can get a fairly comprehensive look at the speech from this al-Jazeera English article (Arabic counterpart here). Al-Assad acknowledged that there are some protesters with legitimate concerns. But he also said there are 64,000 lawless vandals and a third group composed of "radical and blasphemous intellectuals." Even though he conceded the presence of peaceful protesters, there's no reason to believe the supposed presence of elements from the other two groups won't continue to be used as an excuse for the military to conduct armed assaults on civilian targets. Al-Assad also has not abandoned the claim that "outside elements" are instigating the violent conflict inside Syria.
Al-Assad promised to address the grievances of peaceful protesters. I think al-Assad is going to make up relatively minor grievances and "fix" them as an attempt to regain some legitimacy. For instance, he reiterated his pledge to pardon some of those involved in the protests. Um...it's not like people initially started protesting to demand the pardon of protest participants (though many protesters do want to see an end to arbitrary arrests). If al-Assad really wanted to introduce reform aimed at quelling the violence, he'd announce the cessation of arbitrary arrests altogether, instead of vague promises about going easy on those protesting for the past three months.
As another component of his "reform" plan, al-Assad seems to be taking a page out of King Abdullah's book, calling for national dialogue committees of a total of about 100 people to discuss the country's problems and brainstorm solutions. In Jordan, some people dismissed the committee as illegitimate, claiming that since the government convened the committee, it could not be free and independent in its recommendations. I suspect that will be the same case with Syria--with each committee member hand-picked as a "safe choice" and each recommendation reviewed by the regime for approval.
Another disappointing sign was al-Assad's repeated call for "a return"--"a return to a normal way of life," the return of the army to its barracks, the return of Syria to tranquility and "freedom"... basically, a return to exactly how things were before the protests began.
Perhaps the most stunning example of al-Assad's denial was at the very beginning of the speech, when he said, among other interesting blessings, "Peace be upon every mother who lost a loved one, and on every child who lost a parent." As if that blood is not on his hands, in large part.
That's largely how Syrian audiences in the Turkish refugee camps--the easiest Syrian audience for international media to reach--reacted. Most seemed to react to al-Assad's call for them to return to Syria with contempt and suspicion.
Still, not all Syrians have abandoned the president, and despite reports of defections, the military seems to be holding together well enough with their tanks and automatic weapons against the onslaught of civilians armed with protest signs and rocks.
In other Syria-related news, Russian president Dmitri Medvedev clarified his country's position on the crisis, reiterating that Russia will use its veto to defeat any UN resolution on Syria similar to Resolution 1973, which many feel NATO abused to enter into military involvement in Libya. According to this al-Jazeera Arabic article, "he placed moral responsibility for the civilian casualties on the Syrian regime" but went on to say that "he believes Damascus's promises of reform." That makes one of us, I guess.
Saturday, June 18, 2011
Hillary Clinton Has Been Busy
In the past couple of days, the US and several of its NATO allies have been engaging in intensive diplomacy in an attempt to get the required votes to pass another UN resolution condemning the continued violent crackdown in Syria. According to State Department sources, Clinton has been in talks with Russian and Chinese officials*--Russia and China representing the most significant barriers to the resolution's passage, as the holdouts among permanent security council members. The results of these talks remain to be seen--although Presidents Dmitri Medvedev and Hu Jintao issued a statement reiterating their stance against foreign intervention in Syria's internal affairs. The statement indicated that the "international community can provide constructive help to prevent deterioration of the situation" but stopped short of saying what sort of action that might entail.
And all of this over a resolution that doesn't have any sanctions or restrictions in it. Just words.
Nicolai Sarkozy and Angela Merkel held talks in Berlin to talk strategy, and in a press conference afterward, Sarkozy said they have agreed to "tighten sanctions" on Syria. What those more stringent sanctions might be is anyone's guess. A US government source indicated that the US officials are considering pursuing war crimes charges against Syria as a means to increase pressure. But what would that change? You think Bashar al-Assad will call off the dogs just because of being labeled a "war criminal?" 'Fraid not.
*In a fascinating inconsistency, the al-Jazeera English article says no call with Chinese officials has occurred, while the Arabic one says it has.
Sources for this post:
al-Jazeera Arabic article with super-flattering Clinton picture (not)
al-Jazeera Arabic rundown of ongoing diplomatic posturing
al-Jazeera Arabic rundown of Friday's protests (possible graphic photo about halfway down)
al-Jazeera English article on some of this
And all of this over a resolution that doesn't have any sanctions or restrictions in it. Just words.
Nicolai Sarkozy and Angela Merkel held talks in Berlin to talk strategy, and in a press conference afterward, Sarkozy said they have agreed to "tighten sanctions" on Syria. What those more stringent sanctions might be is anyone's guess. A US government source indicated that the US officials are considering pursuing war crimes charges against Syria as a means to increase pressure. But what would that change? You think Bashar al-Assad will call off the dogs just because of being labeled a "war criminal?" 'Fraid not.
*In a fascinating inconsistency, the al-Jazeera English article says no call with Chinese officials has occurred, while the Arabic one says it has.
Sources for this post:
al-Jazeera Arabic article with super-flattering Clinton picture (not)
al-Jazeera Arabic rundown of ongoing diplomatic posturing
al-Jazeera Arabic rundown of Friday's protests (possible graphic photo about halfway down)
al-Jazeera English article on some of this
Thursday, June 16, 2011
In Today's Obvious News
To absolutely no one's surprise, Ayman al-Zawahiri has been appointed the new al-Qaeda leader following Osama bin Laden's death in a US raid last month. al-Jazeera English report This is a good PR move for al-Qaeda, seeing as al-Zarqawi is probably the only al-Qaeda commander left alive whose name is somewhat known on the American street.
In other sadly predictable news, the "deplorable" situation in Syria continues, and the international community continues to watch idly. This (al-Jazeera English) explains why Russia and China (among others) are continuing to stonewall efforts in the UN to issue another resolution condemning the violence against civilians. Basically, NATO used a similar resolution to justify military action in Libya, and some countries anticipate a similar trajectory with respect to Syria. Other, more cynical voices also point to military and economic interests China and Russia have in Syria.
International observers are still not being let in to Syria to assess the conditions, investigate claims of torture and mass killings, and provide humanitarian aid. Unfortunately, that is not likely to change. It's times like these I wish there was a special, highly-trained force of humanitarian relief workers trained in covert operations. Like Green Berets, but armed with water and medicine instead of guns and whatnot.
In other sadly predictable news, the "deplorable" situation in Syria continues, and the international community continues to watch idly. This (al-Jazeera English) explains why Russia and China (among others) are continuing to stonewall efforts in the UN to issue another resolution condemning the violence against civilians. Basically, NATO used a similar resolution to justify military action in Libya, and some countries anticipate a similar trajectory with respect to Syria. Other, more cynical voices also point to military and economic interests China and Russia have in Syria.
International observers are still not being let in to Syria to assess the conditions, investigate claims of torture and mass killings, and provide humanitarian aid. Unfortunately, that is not likely to change. It's times like these I wish there was a special, highly-trained force of humanitarian relief workers trained in covert operations. Like Green Berets, but armed with water and medicine instead of guns and whatnot.
Wednesday, June 15, 2011
Al-Jazeera Follows This Blog
...not intended to be a factual statement. But al-Jazeera Arabic did post a more in-depth article on Jordan after I posted yesterday.
In order to appease discontented protesters, King Abdullah put together a "National Dialogue Committee" tasked with identifying needed reforms. In a speech last week, the King already expressed his willingness to go along with the committee's directives pertaining to the party system and the appointment of cabinet members and prime ministers (currently the sole discretion of the King).
But as one critic pointed out in an interview with al-Jazeera, the committee was formed and overseen by the government, keeping control in the government itself and away from the people. He sees this shortcoming of the committee as exacerbating mistrust between the government and the Jordanian people.
Scholars and activists are also debating whether reforming policies will be enough, given the over-bureaucratization and pervasive corruption that hinder most efforts to reform. Some point to deeper problems inherent in the system of government that make it weak, hesitant, and slow--problems that must be addressed aggressively, instead of spreading a veneer of reform over the surface of an essentially unchanged crisis.
I agree with many international observers in thinking that the fact that King Abdullah is willing to cede some powers is a good sign for Jordan. It's a sign of, as the al-Jazeera article puts it, "the existence of the political will to achieve reform." What remains to be seen is if intensive efforts to root out corruption will be implemented effectively.
If you look at the photo at the top of the al-Jazeera article, both protest signs refer specifically to corruption. The one on the left says "In the presence of corruption, all pay the price." The one on the right reads "Toward a Jordan free from corruption."
In order to appease discontented protesters, King Abdullah put together a "National Dialogue Committee" tasked with identifying needed reforms. In a speech last week, the King already expressed his willingness to go along with the committee's directives pertaining to the party system and the appointment of cabinet members and prime ministers (currently the sole discretion of the King).
But as one critic pointed out in an interview with al-Jazeera, the committee was formed and overseen by the government, keeping control in the government itself and away from the people. He sees this shortcoming of the committee as exacerbating mistrust between the government and the Jordanian people.
Scholars and activists are also debating whether reforming policies will be enough, given the over-bureaucratization and pervasive corruption that hinder most efforts to reform. Some point to deeper problems inherent in the system of government that make it weak, hesitant, and slow--problems that must be addressed aggressively, instead of spreading a veneer of reform over the surface of an essentially unchanged crisis.
I agree with many international observers in thinking that the fact that King Abdullah is willing to cede some powers is a good sign for Jordan. It's a sign of, as the al-Jazeera article puts it, "the existence of the political will to achieve reform." What remains to be seen is if intensive efforts to root out corruption will be implemented effectively.
If you look at the photo at the top of the al-Jazeera article, both protest signs refer specifically to corruption. The one on the left says "In the presence of corruption, all pay the price." The one on the right reads "Toward a Jordan free from corruption."
Ben Ali Trial Set
Ousted Tunisian president Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali and his wife Leila are probably living it up in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, due to a Saudi non-response to Tunisia's extradition request. But the interim government has decided to proceed with the trial in absentia, beginning June 20 (al-Jazeera Arabic; New York Times). Mr. and Mrs. Ben Ali face between 5 and 20 years in prison on preliminary charges related to "drugs, weapons and racketeering," although interim president al-Baji al-Sebsi indicated additional charges could be added later.
The trial in absentia leads to the inevitable debate over whether the trial means anything if Ben Ali can't actually be incarcerated at the end of it. It may be important just to to bring a sense of closure to the whole ordeal, and as an opportunity to sift through the detritus of the past 23 years and see what went wrong. After all, those who do not learn from the past are doomed to relive it.
The trial in absentia leads to the inevitable debate over whether the trial means anything if Ben Ali can't actually be incarcerated at the end of it. It may be important just to to bring a sense of closure to the whole ordeal, and as an opportunity to sift through the detritus of the past 23 years and see what went wrong. After all, those who do not learn from the past are doomed to relive it.
Tuesday, June 14, 2011
Quick Link: Syrian Army Defections
Josh Landis's take
Following up on yesterday's post about how the violence could end if the army would stand with the Syrian people.
Following up on yesterday's post about how the violence could end if the army would stand with the Syrian people.
The Revolution that Isn't: Jordan
Something happened when the King of Jordan visited the southern city of Tafila on Monday. Sources disagree about what it was. Some reports describe "clashes" between young people and the King's security detail, others say the King's motorcade was hit by rocks, and Jordanian government officials insist that while people trying to reach the king "were stopped," with nothing untoward happened (Al-Jazeera Arabic; Al-Jazeera English).
In a region rocked by turmoil, Jordan has been relatively quiet. Criticism of the government is allowed, but criticism of the royal family is not--a policy enforced by the mukhabarat (secret police). There have been some significant protests, but so far frustrations have been directed at government ministers and parliament. Activists in Tafila issued a statement after Monday's scuffle, for example, criticizing the security forces for getting in the way, preventing the King from seeing "the reality that Jordan and Jordanians live in." Al-Jazeera also obtained a copy of the statement activists were trying to get to the King himself, which sets forth the people's grievances, including injustice, marginalization, neglect, infringement of rights, and confiscation of property. The statement also expressed the activists' belief that the 2007 and 2010 parliamentary elections were rigged.
King Abdullah, for his part, has promised reforms, specifically aimed a reducing corruption and election fraud. Back in February, he fired the unpopular prime minister. He has recently "promised to relinquish his right to appoint prime ministers and cabinets" (BBC article). Despite the economic problems in Jordan, the royal family remains beloved. But if the new elections the King promises do not produce the uncorrupted results the popular movements want, there could be more violent discontent down the road.
In a region rocked by turmoil, Jordan has been relatively quiet. Criticism of the government is allowed, but criticism of the royal family is not--a policy enforced by the mukhabarat (secret police). There have been some significant protests, but so far frustrations have been directed at government ministers and parliament. Activists in Tafila issued a statement after Monday's scuffle, for example, criticizing the security forces for getting in the way, preventing the King from seeing "the reality that Jordan and Jordanians live in." Al-Jazeera also obtained a copy of the statement activists were trying to get to the King himself, which sets forth the people's grievances, including injustice, marginalization, neglect, infringement of rights, and confiscation of property. The statement also expressed the activists' belief that the 2007 and 2010 parliamentary elections were rigged.
King Abdullah, for his part, has promised reforms, specifically aimed a reducing corruption and election fraud. Back in February, he fired the unpopular prime minister. He has recently "promised to relinquish his right to appoint prime ministers and cabinets" (BBC article). Despite the economic problems in Jordan, the royal family remains beloved. But if the new elections the King promises do not produce the uncorrupted results the popular movements want, there could be more violent discontent down the road.
The Curious Case of Amina Abdullah Part 2
In this post, I talked about the controversy surrounding Syrian blogger Amina Abdullah and her purported abduction.
Then, this happened (al-Jazeera English). An American (ugh, why did it have to be an American) living in Scotland admitted he made Amina Abdullah up. In the first of two posts on the blog, he balked at accepting any criticism: "I do not believe that I have harmed anyone - I feel that I have created an important voice for issues that I feel strongly about." The second post, on the other hand, is full of profuse apologies. In it, MacMaster fully explicates how he became Amina and couldn't stop himself from escalating his obsession. It is both fascinating and, in my personal opinion, kind of creepy.
Some who were taken in and some who weren't have reacted fiercely, angered that activists who could've been spending their time on worthier pursuits were instead led on a wild goose chase of a campaign to free a non-existent blogger. The Guardian and other media outlets among the first to pick up the hoax are also under fire for not digging into the blog author's identity before running with the story.
More on the fallout in this Youtube video of a CBC interview with Mona Eltahawy, who knew MacMaster. She makes some good points about how this whole ordeal, while reaching a wide audience in the West, likely has had little impact in Syria. That might help MacMaster sleep a little better at night.
Then, this happened (al-Jazeera English). An American (ugh, why did it have to be an American) living in Scotland admitted he made Amina Abdullah up. In the first of two posts on the blog, he balked at accepting any criticism: "I do not believe that I have harmed anyone - I feel that I have created an important voice for issues that I feel strongly about." The second post, on the other hand, is full of profuse apologies. In it, MacMaster fully explicates how he became Amina and couldn't stop himself from escalating his obsession. It is both fascinating and, in my personal opinion, kind of creepy.
Some who were taken in and some who weren't have reacted fiercely, angered that activists who could've been spending their time on worthier pursuits were instead led on a wild goose chase of a campaign to free a non-existent blogger. The Guardian and other media outlets among the first to pick up the hoax are also under fire for not digging into the blog author's identity before running with the story.
More on the fallout in this Youtube video of a CBC interview with Mona Eltahawy, who knew MacMaster. She makes some good points about how this whole ordeal, while reaching a wide audience in the West, likely has had little impact in Syria. That might help MacMaster sleep a little better at night.
Malek Jandali v. ADC Round One...ding!
Malek Jandali (website--not particularly well-updated but has bio and sound clips--here) is a Syrian-German-American pianist and composer, most known for making me jealous of his glossy Steinways. As a result of his unique accomplishments, Jandali was invited to perform at the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) convention last weekend in Washington, D.C. But according to reports (in English at Politico; in Arabic at al-Jazeera), his invitation was yanked after higher-ups objected to one song on his set list: "Watani Ana" (I am my homeland and my homeland is me) and Jandali refused to omit it. In this statement published on their website, the ADC vehemently denied allegations of "being against pro-democracy speech." The statement claims the ADC put the kibosh on the song to avoid "fomenting the divisiveness that inevitably emerges in the Arab American community where domestic Arab politics are concerned." Then, in one of the most dizzyingly obvious hypocrisies I've ever seen, the statement concludes, with reference to those domestic Arab politics, "ADC’s resolution not to promote any particular side of a dispute is misunderstood as a failure to uphold the underlying principles upon which ADC is based. ADC unequivocally supports civil rights and liberties for all people and condemns any action that undermines the freedom or dignity of any human being." Translation: "We're not taking sides, but that doesn't mean we're not taking sides."
With the ADC's statement only adding fuel to the fire, there were claims that the real reason the ACD sent Jandali packing was because of the close relationship between the Syrian ambassador to the US (Imad Moustafa) and the ADC, in particular its chairman, Safa Rifka.
Jandali, for his part, said he remains in the dark as to the reason the conference's organizers reacted in such a way to the song. He sees "Watani Ana" as a "humanitarian" song directed against oppression in every country, not as a "political" song specifically aimed at any one regime, adding that the song doesn't refer explicitly to Syria or even the Middle East.
Two days after its first statement was issued, the ADC published a second one, reversing its decision and announcing the playing of "Watani Ana" (without Jandali and without his permission) as the focal point of that evening's gala. The statement does not explain the reason for the reversal.
According to a second Politico article, the convention was largely overtaken by debate over this series of events. There were boycotts, impromptu discussion panels, and various acts of "disobedience" (such as a speaker defiantly reading the lyrics to the song as part of his talk).
The ADC came out of this with a huge black eye. They will face many difficult questions in the coming days about who they answer to (there are also claims of Gulf state patronage), and how they should be responding to the Arab Spring.
So what do you think?
With the ADC's statement only adding fuel to the fire, there were claims that the real reason the ACD sent Jandali packing was because of the close relationship between the Syrian ambassador to the US (Imad Moustafa) and the ADC, in particular its chairman, Safa Rifka.
Jandali, for his part, said he remains in the dark as to the reason the conference's organizers reacted in such a way to the song. He sees "Watani Ana" as a "humanitarian" song directed against oppression in every country, not as a "political" song specifically aimed at any one regime, adding that the song doesn't refer explicitly to Syria or even the Middle East.
Two days after its first statement was issued, the ADC published a second one, reversing its decision and announcing the playing of "Watani Ana" (without Jandali and without his permission) as the focal point of that evening's gala. The statement does not explain the reason for the reversal.
According to a second Politico article, the convention was largely overtaken by debate over this series of events. There were boycotts, impromptu discussion panels, and various acts of "disobedience" (such as a speaker defiantly reading the lyrics to the song as part of his talk).
The ADC came out of this with a huge black eye. They will face many difficult questions in the coming days about who they answer to (there are also claims of Gulf state patronage), and how they should be responding to the Arab Spring.
So what do you think?
An Update on the (Real) Job Hunt
(I apologize in advance if this post seems whiny)
So the past few days I've been posting less because I've been chasing around the specter of a job that will, if nothing else, keep me from having to explain a period of unemployment on my resume and from starving to death in the fall. I can now tell you that I was evidently aiming too high by shooting for an hourly retail job. I also thought about digging holes or some sort of manual labor, but then I remembered I'm a female with T-rex arms (though they're deceptively strong, I must say) and this suburb is stuck in the '50s, so I'd probably be rejected on the grounds that I might strain my ovaries or something. Besides, I've already applied for a dozen unpaid internships and been turned down for every single one. If no one will deign to allow me to toil away for them for free, why should I expect some other poor sap to pay me?
And really, now that I've all but abandoned hope of finding Middle East or policy-related employment, why should I be paid to do something I don't want to do and am no good at? Taking the pre-employment quiz at Macy's, I kept having premonitions of working on commission in the shoe department--a circumstance I would find abhorrent, although future employers in the policy world would no doubt like to hear about the time I talked a lady up from Crocs to Prada or whatever kids are wearing these days by guilting her about unfair labor practices in Crocs factories.
Meanwhile, I'm still trying to negotiate the future possibilities of the internship that fell through, but my contact hasn't replied to my (time-sensitive) e-mails in the last week and a half, so I'm left to assume I said something terribly offensive. Or she knows I've been griping about her organization's bureaucratic inefficiency non-stop for the past two weeks.
Collectively, this whole mess just makes me feel disappointed. I can borrow a bajillion dollars in students loans so I can eat and have a roof over my head in the fall (unless Congress votes to abolish student loans entirely, which at this point wouldn't surprise me). I can get used to the idea of graduating a semester late and watching my friends get awesome jobs before me and throwing my 3-year life plan out the window again. What really bothers me is that right now, I have the ability to contribute beneficially to some sort of organization instead of flinging my ideas anonymously into cyberspace, and I'm not being given the opportunity to do so.
But I won't let this summer become a waste. Between this blog and some pieces I plan to write for journals and whatnot, I'm going to make myself come out of this summer a better candidate for a job next year, if only to spite the people who passed on me this time around.
So the past few days I've been posting less because I've been chasing around the specter of a job that will, if nothing else, keep me from having to explain a period of unemployment on my resume and from starving to death in the fall. I can now tell you that I was evidently aiming too high by shooting for an hourly retail job. I also thought about digging holes or some sort of manual labor, but then I remembered I'm a female with T-rex arms (though they're deceptively strong, I must say) and this suburb is stuck in the '50s, so I'd probably be rejected on the grounds that I might strain my ovaries or something. Besides, I've already applied for a dozen unpaid internships and been turned down for every single one. If no one will deign to allow me to toil away for them for free, why should I expect some other poor sap to pay me?
And really, now that I've all but abandoned hope of finding Middle East or policy-related employment, why should I be paid to do something I don't want to do and am no good at? Taking the pre-employment quiz at Macy's, I kept having premonitions of working on commission in the shoe department--a circumstance I would find abhorrent, although future employers in the policy world would no doubt like to hear about the time I talked a lady up from Crocs to Prada or whatever kids are wearing these days by guilting her about unfair labor practices in Crocs factories.
Meanwhile, I'm still trying to negotiate the future possibilities of the internship that fell through, but my contact hasn't replied to my (time-sensitive) e-mails in the last week and a half, so I'm left to assume I said something terribly offensive. Or she knows I've been griping about her organization's bureaucratic inefficiency non-stop for the past two weeks.
Collectively, this whole mess just makes me feel disappointed. I can borrow a bajillion dollars in students loans so I can eat and have a roof over my head in the fall (unless Congress votes to abolish student loans entirely, which at this point wouldn't surprise me). I can get used to the idea of graduating a semester late and watching my friends get awesome jobs before me and throwing my 3-year life plan out the window again. What really bothers me is that right now, I have the ability to contribute beneficially to some sort of organization instead of flinging my ideas anonymously into cyberspace, and I'm not being given the opportunity to do so.
But I won't let this summer become a waste. Between this blog and some pieces I plan to write for journals and whatnot, I'm going to make myself come out of this summer a better candidate for a job next year, if only to spite the people who passed on me this time around.
Monday, June 13, 2011
Syria: International Response Part 2
The press has been paying the most attention to American, British, and German reactions to the situation in Syria. Conspicuously absent is the mention of Arab leaders' responses--possibly because the Arab leaders are absenting themselves. This al-Jazeera article (Arabic; can't find an English equivalent yet) contains the first mention I have seen of any response from Arab leaders. The article reports that the Secretary General of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, has criticized the "extremely dangerous" situation in Syria and called for Arab nations to arrive at a unified stance on it. He indicated that "intensive" talks are going on among Arab leaders behind the scenes, and acknowledged that the Arab League is receiving criticism for its silence on the crisis thus far. Elsewhere in the article, there are reports of protests outside the Syrian embassy in Algeria--an indication that Arabs outside Syria are getting restless with the lack of response.
I felt pretty bad about my lack of constructive suggestions for an effective international response to the violence in Syria in yesterday's post. Reading this article (al-Jazeera English) got me thinking again. What could get the Syrian army and security forces to quit firing on civilians and stand with the Syrian people? Is it too late for them to lay off the regime's Kool-aid about "armed insurgents" and gangs of terrorists? I want to believe that there's no way anyone could keep mowing down unarmed civilians and telling themselves they were "terrorist armed groups coming from outside Syria" and deserved to die. But as we all know, people have a seemingly limitless capacity for evil. We may just have to wait and see if these defections snowball into something more significant. In the mean time, I'll be trying to think of ways to get soldiers to give up soldiering.
One other thing to keep an eye on (as if there aren't enough already): the Syrian border with Turkey. Thousands of refugees have poured over the border and thousands more stand poised to do so if they need to. So far Turkey has accepted this influx. But if the trickle becomes a flood and international aid doesn't help meet the refugees' needs, there could be problems--food, water, medical care, and shelter shortages, friction between refugees and Turks, etc.--that might, in a worst-case scenario, lead to closure of the border, trapping Syrians in the army's path. And that would be a humanitarian disaster on a massive scale.
I felt pretty bad about my lack of constructive suggestions for an effective international response to the violence in Syria in yesterday's post. Reading this article (al-Jazeera English) got me thinking again. What could get the Syrian army and security forces to quit firing on civilians and stand with the Syrian people? Is it too late for them to lay off the regime's Kool-aid about "armed insurgents" and gangs of terrorists? I want to believe that there's no way anyone could keep mowing down unarmed civilians and telling themselves they were "terrorist armed groups coming from outside Syria" and deserved to die. But as we all know, people have a seemingly limitless capacity for evil. We may just have to wait and see if these defections snowball into something more significant. In the mean time, I'll be trying to think of ways to get soldiers to give up soldiering.
One other thing to keep an eye on (as if there aren't enough already): the Syrian border with Turkey. Thousands of refugees have poured over the border and thousands more stand poised to do so if they need to. So far Turkey has accepted this influx. But if the trickle becomes a flood and international aid doesn't help meet the refugees' needs, there could be problems--food, water, medical care, and shelter shortages, friction between refugees and Turks, etc.--that might, in a worst-case scenario, lead to closure of the border, trapping Syrians in the army's path. And that would be a humanitarian disaster on a massive scale.
Sunday, June 12, 2011
Syria: International Response
In this post, I mentioned that the international response to the killing of Syrian protesters has not been significant. This al-Jazeera article (Arabic; similar content in this Guardian article) goes into some more detail. The US and European Union have "expressed their worry" about the humanitarian situation in Syria, with varying degrees of condemnation of al-Assad's regime. William Hague is calling for direct talks between UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. According to UN sources, al-Assad is refusing because of Ban's outspoken criticism of his regime since the protests broke out.
Further efforts to condemn the Syrian regime's actions as "bloody repression" are being blocked by several countries on the UN Security Council, including Russia and China. Representatives from those two countries were conspicuously absent from talks discussing the contents of a new resolution, and they threatened to use the veto to defeat it.
US officials have accused al-Assad of creating a humanitarian crisis, called for an immediate cessation of attacks on civilians, and asked that Red Cross workers be allowed access to the northern part of the country. If the regime doesn't comply, then what? Then nothing. Nobody is willing to table any kind of action besides writing statements of displeasure, particularly with how NATO intervention in Libya is faring (al-Jazeera English article). Al-Assad isn't stupid. He knows he's likely safe from military action as long as NATO is tied up with their mission in Libya.
Really, though, what can international audiences do when the leader of a country decides to turn his tanks on his own people?
Condemning UN resolutions? Not even a slap on the wrist.
Air strikes? Not working too terribly well in Libya.
Ground war? Human, material, and political costs often prohibitive
Diplomatic envoys? I wouldn't hold my breath for al-Assad to be persuaded to abdicate power or change his course.
Targeted killing/assassination? Won't make you too many friends in the international community, and no guarantee of making the problems go away.
Economic sanctions? Large-scale sanctions arguably more likely to harm civilians than the regime. Small-scale sanctions not likely to faze an autocrat who's made himself a pretty penny from state coffers over the years.
Arm the opposition? Can come back to haunt you (how many times has the US backed a coup and created a monster?)
Nothing? It's not too fun to stand helplessly and watch innocent civilians be victimized.
So what should we do? I think any sort of military intervention is to be avoided. The Syrian protesters need to defeat al-Assad's regime on their own. This Guardian piece on Libya puts it in far more eloquent terms than I could. But basically if the international community doesn't get in the way, there's a chance Syrians could emerge victorious, more unified for and more invested in the future. Perhaps that's my idealism talking, though.
The Red Cross should do everything they can to get into the country, and they should already be in Turkey, where Syrian refugees are streaming over the border and living in tent cities.
Further efforts to condemn the Syrian regime's actions as "bloody repression" are being blocked by several countries on the UN Security Council, including Russia and China. Representatives from those two countries were conspicuously absent from talks discussing the contents of a new resolution, and they threatened to use the veto to defeat it.
US officials have accused al-Assad of creating a humanitarian crisis, called for an immediate cessation of attacks on civilians, and asked that Red Cross workers be allowed access to the northern part of the country. If the regime doesn't comply, then what? Then nothing. Nobody is willing to table any kind of action besides writing statements of displeasure, particularly with how NATO intervention in Libya is faring (al-Jazeera English article). Al-Assad isn't stupid. He knows he's likely safe from military action as long as NATO is tied up with their mission in Libya.
Really, though, what can international audiences do when the leader of a country decides to turn his tanks on his own people?
Condemning UN resolutions? Not even a slap on the wrist.
Air strikes? Not working too terribly well in Libya.
Ground war? Human, material, and political costs often prohibitive
Diplomatic envoys? I wouldn't hold my breath for al-Assad to be persuaded to abdicate power or change his course.
Targeted killing/assassination? Won't make you too many friends in the international community, and no guarantee of making the problems go away.
Economic sanctions? Large-scale sanctions arguably more likely to harm civilians than the regime. Small-scale sanctions not likely to faze an autocrat who's made himself a pretty penny from state coffers over the years.
Arm the opposition? Can come back to haunt you (how many times has the US backed a coup and created a monster?)
Nothing? It's not too fun to stand helplessly and watch innocent civilians be victimized.
So what should we do? I think any sort of military intervention is to be avoided. The Syrian protesters need to defeat al-Assad's regime on their own. This Guardian piece on Libya puts it in far more eloquent terms than I could. But basically if the international community doesn't get in the way, there's a chance Syrians could emerge victorious, more unified for and more invested in the future. Perhaps that's my idealism talking, though.
The Red Cross should do everything they can to get into the country, and they should already be in Turkey, where Syrian refugees are streaming over the border and living in tent cities.
Saturday, June 11, 2011
How Bad Are Saleh's Wounds?
..and what does that mean for the revolution in Yemen?
As I said in this post, the president of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh sought treatment at a Saudi hospital last week for treatment of wounds sustained in the bombing of his palace. The initial assessment of his injuries seemed to be of the "stitches and maybe a little light plastic surgery" variety (like the time I twirled around in circles too many times, got dizzy, fell, and bit through my lip). Then US officials reported his injuries were much more severe--possibly life-threatening. Now, more than a week since the attack, no one can agree on just how severe Saleh's injuries really are.
The Yemeni ambassador to London and a Saudi spokesperson painted a rosy portrait, saying that Saleh is stable, able to speak and rest comfortably, and has been removed from intensive care.
According to a French paper, however, another Yemeni official indicated that Saleh is still in poor health, specifically related to respiratory issues, and no one is being allowed to visit him.
Just to further muddle the situation, questions may be arising about who was responsible for the attack on the [mosque within the] palace in the first place. While attributed to al-Ahmar tribesmen (discussed in this Mental_Floss article I posted yesterday), some ballistic evidence may indicate that the plot was actually carried out by regime insiders--in particular the fact that damage was inflicted by a bomb, not a mortar, and that the windows were blown outward rather than inward. The latter would indicate that the cause of the explosion was a bomb located inside the mosque.
What effect might this uncertainty have on protests? Protesters so far seem to view Saleh's absence as a victory and open door for their cause, as evidenced by the cheering crowds after his departure for treatment. At least one Yemeni journalist, Najib al-Yafa'yi (there's no good way to transliterate that last name, sorry), is urging protesters not to be distracted by the controversy (which he sees as a Saudi plot). According to al-Yafa'yi, the protesters have to focus on getting an interim council together to take over the governance of the country. Otherwise, he warns, Saleh's sons could orchestrate a military takeover. al-Jazeera Arabic article
In my search to find a comparable English article (AFP via GoogleNews, but doesn't have the ballistics stuff in it), I came across this one from AJE, in which the writer talks about the various groups grappling for power in Saleh's absence and speculates about who might ultimately assume control of the control. Probably the subject of a post tomorrow.
As I said in this post, the president of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh sought treatment at a Saudi hospital last week for treatment of wounds sustained in the bombing of his palace. The initial assessment of his injuries seemed to be of the "stitches and maybe a little light plastic surgery" variety (like the time I twirled around in circles too many times, got dizzy, fell, and bit through my lip). Then US officials reported his injuries were much more severe--possibly life-threatening. Now, more than a week since the attack, no one can agree on just how severe Saleh's injuries really are.
The Yemeni ambassador to London and a Saudi spokesperson painted a rosy portrait, saying that Saleh is stable, able to speak and rest comfortably, and has been removed from intensive care.
According to a French paper, however, another Yemeni official indicated that Saleh is still in poor health, specifically related to respiratory issues, and no one is being allowed to visit him.
Just to further muddle the situation, questions may be arising about who was responsible for the attack on the [mosque within the] palace in the first place. While attributed to al-Ahmar tribesmen (discussed in this Mental_Floss article I posted yesterday), some ballistic evidence may indicate that the plot was actually carried out by regime insiders--in particular the fact that damage was inflicted by a bomb, not a mortar, and that the windows were blown outward rather than inward. The latter would indicate that the cause of the explosion was a bomb located inside the mosque.
What effect might this uncertainty have on protests? Protesters so far seem to view Saleh's absence as a victory and open door for their cause, as evidenced by the cheering crowds after his departure for treatment. At least one Yemeni journalist, Najib al-Yafa'yi (there's no good way to transliterate that last name, sorry), is urging protesters not to be distracted by the controversy (which he sees as a Saudi plot). According to al-Yafa'yi, the protesters have to focus on getting an interim council together to take over the governance of the country. Otherwise, he warns, Saleh's sons could orchestrate a military takeover. al-Jazeera Arabic article
In my search to find a comparable English article (AFP via GoogleNews, but doesn't have the ballistics stuff in it), I came across this one from AJE, in which the writer talks about the various groups grappling for power in Saleh's absence and speculates about who might ultimately assume control of the control. Probably the subject of a post tomorrow.
Friday, June 10, 2011
Friday Mishmash Extravaganza and Swap-Meet
(Full disclosure: I don't know what a swap-meet is, exactly. It just sounds good)
All sorts of goodies for you today! (and I didn't forget about the second part of Mere's question, I promise)
Up first, we've got a MentalFloss article on Yemen (if you don't occasionally read Mental_Floss, you should--check out the recurring Strange Geographies and Talking Pictures articles, for a start). If only this article had been posted a few days earlier, I could've spared myself the trouble of the all the typing I did. :-) I think this very reader-friendly article complements mine quite nicely, because Edwards focuses more on social and cultural aspects of Yemen than its political history, while still pointing out the main problems--er, "opportunities" that exist there.
Next we've got an interesting bit of journalism from Vogue. I don't typically read it because I'm a Philistine when it comes to high fashion, but several months ago I flipped through an issue at the Caswell House. And who should be the feature of a glowingly complimentary feature? Asma al-Assad--wife of Bashar. That link is to the largest excerpt of the article I could find (including an interesting one of Bashar playing with his kids). After initially defending their story, Vogue apparently took the article off their website. Reading the article for the first time, I couldn't help thinking that, in polite (though not scholarly) terms, the author had no clue what she was talking about. She talks about how Mrs. Al-Assad wants "to change the mind-set of six million Syrians under eighteen [and] encourage them to engage in what she calls ‘active citizenship.'" Interesting. Bashar came to power in 2000. The "Damascus Spring" ended 10 years ago (link to my Syria Background post). And as this Foreign Affairs article points out, the regime has not passed "a single meaningful act of reform."* Basically, if the author would have done her homework, she'd have seen that Bashar al-Assad's regime has been spouting the same platitudes about reform for a decade, all the while jailing activists and employing a huge intelligence apparatus to spy on citizens--and now using tanks and troops to crush protests. Check out the Syrian regime's latest response to "active citizenship" here (al-Jazeera English article on today's protests).
*I don't count the repeal of the emergency law as "meaningful," since no discernible change on the ground has materialized. Intelligence officials are still operating with impunity and protests are still effectively illegal. The disbanding of the state security courts seems unlikely to prove meaningful either. The regime simply has too many means of arresting and holding people without ever bringing them to trial.
Finally (for now), a quick bit about music and the Arab Spring. I plan to write a longer piece eventually, but for now I just wanted to introduce a recent interest of mine: Arabic rap. I used to harbor ill-will toward modern rap in general, because I thought it was all materialistic, degrading to women, and serving to promote drugs and gangs. Then I dragged myself to an Omar Offendum (Syrian-American poet/rapper) concert, and I saw things completely differently. In the work of many contemporary Arab rappers, I see a return to what rap was meant to be as an art form: a medium for a meaningful (gee I'm using that word a lot today) message. Here are some examples (NPR article with embedded Youtube videos). And here is an al-Jazeera English interview with Omar Offendum about his #Jan25 collaboration.
Also, as a matter of housekeeping, a couple of people have told me they can't post comments. I tried to fix it, but is that still the case?
More later!
All sorts of goodies for you today! (and I didn't forget about the second part of Mere's question, I promise)
Up first, we've got a MentalFloss article on Yemen (if you don't occasionally read Mental_Floss, you should--check out the recurring Strange Geographies and Talking Pictures articles, for a start). If only this article had been posted a few days earlier, I could've spared myself the trouble of the all the typing I did. :-) I think this very reader-friendly article complements mine quite nicely, because Edwards focuses more on social and cultural aspects of Yemen than its political history, while still pointing out the main problems--er, "opportunities" that exist there.
Next we've got an interesting bit of journalism from Vogue. I don't typically read it because I'm a Philistine when it comes to high fashion, but several months ago I flipped through an issue at the Caswell House. And who should be the feature of a glowingly complimentary feature? Asma al-Assad--wife of Bashar. That link is to the largest excerpt of the article I could find (including an interesting one of Bashar playing with his kids). After initially defending their story, Vogue apparently took the article off their website. Reading the article for the first time, I couldn't help thinking that, in polite (though not scholarly) terms, the author had no clue what she was talking about. She talks about how Mrs. Al-Assad wants "to change the mind-set of six million Syrians under eighteen [and] encourage them to engage in what she calls ‘active citizenship.'" Interesting. Bashar came to power in 2000. The "Damascus Spring" ended 10 years ago (link to my Syria Background post). And as this Foreign Affairs article points out, the regime has not passed "a single meaningful act of reform."* Basically, if the author would have done her homework, she'd have seen that Bashar al-Assad's regime has been spouting the same platitudes about reform for a decade, all the while jailing activists and employing a huge intelligence apparatus to spy on citizens--and now using tanks and troops to crush protests. Check out the Syrian regime's latest response to "active citizenship" here (al-Jazeera English article on today's protests).
*I don't count the repeal of the emergency law as "meaningful," since no discernible change on the ground has materialized. Intelligence officials are still operating with impunity and protests are still effectively illegal. The disbanding of the state security courts seems unlikely to prove meaningful either. The regime simply has too many means of arresting and holding people without ever bringing them to trial.
Finally (for now), a quick bit about music and the Arab Spring. I plan to write a longer piece eventually, but for now I just wanted to introduce a recent interest of mine: Arabic rap. I used to harbor ill-will toward modern rap in general, because I thought it was all materialistic, degrading to women, and serving to promote drugs and gangs. Then I dragged myself to an Omar Offendum (Syrian-American poet/rapper) concert, and I saw things completely differently. In the work of many contemporary Arab rappers, I see a return to what rap was meant to be as an art form: a medium for a meaningful (gee I'm using that word a lot today) message. Here are some examples (NPR article with embedded Youtube videos). And here is an al-Jazeera English interview with Omar Offendum about his #Jan25 collaboration.
Also, as a matter of housekeeping, a couple of people have told me they can't post comments. I tried to fix it, but is that still the case?
More later!
Thursday, June 9, 2011
More on al-Jazeera and Terrorists on the Internet
My lovely and devoted friend Mere had a comment/question:
"I have never noticed there to be a public perception of al-Jazeera not being a high quality news source, or a general disregard for the fact that terrorists use Internet as a tool. You think this is the case?"
About al-Jazeera: In a word, yes. Allegations of various biases are rampant. First, let's rewind about 10 years. Al-Jazeera showed up on Western radars in a big way because it was the primary recipient of a series of videos featuring one Osama bin Laden. Al-Jazeera's decision to broadcast the videos (without harsh condemnation of the contents) led to accusations from US officials that the network was serving as a "mouthpiece for al-Qaeda" (thank you, Donald Rumsfeld). PBS Article During the Iraq War years, Al-Jazeera has also been criticized by the coalition governments for showing graphic images of the bodies of dead coalition troops and civilians, which supposedly incites anti-American sentiment. BBC article Basically, al-Jazeera caused the Bush administration to lose the news war in Iraq, and they were not happy about it. But you asked about public perception, not government perception. Well, Secretary Clinton certainly ignited a firestorm when she complimented al-Jazeera's coverage of the Arab Spring, calling it "real news," in March. HuffPo article I don't have any concrete numbers, but there must be thousands of op-eds out there lambasting her for her endorsement of an "anti-American" network (I clicked on a Yahoo!news article thinking it would be pretty middle-of-the-road...not so much). So it seems to me that, while changing somewhat, there are still a lot of folks out there who see al-Jazeera as Osama bin--er, Ayman al-Zawahiri's personal megaphone. I know this study isn't perfect, but I think it's an interesting read nonetheless. Basically, the study had three groups. One was not shown a video clip, while the other two were shown exactly the same clip, except one had CNN logos and the other had al-Jazeera English (AJE). All three groups answered the same questions about trustworthiness, likelihood to watch, etc. Without going into numerical details (those can be found at the link above) AJE "was evaluated significantly less favorably" than CNN across the board. Additionally, participants who saw the video clip with CNN logos rated CNN more favorably than those who saw no clip, but AJE wasn't rated any higher by participants who saw the same clip.
The second part's going to have to wait until tomorrow. Ice cream calls. :-)
"I have never noticed there to be a public perception of al-Jazeera not being a high quality news source, or a general disregard for the fact that terrorists use Internet as a tool. You think this is the case?"
About al-Jazeera: In a word, yes. Allegations of various biases are rampant. First, let's rewind about 10 years. Al-Jazeera showed up on Western radars in a big way because it was the primary recipient of a series of videos featuring one Osama bin Laden. Al-Jazeera's decision to broadcast the videos (without harsh condemnation of the contents) led to accusations from US officials that the network was serving as a "mouthpiece for al-Qaeda" (thank you, Donald Rumsfeld). PBS Article During the Iraq War years, Al-Jazeera has also been criticized by the coalition governments for showing graphic images of the bodies of dead coalition troops and civilians, which supposedly incites anti-American sentiment. BBC article Basically, al-Jazeera caused the Bush administration to lose the news war in Iraq, and they were not happy about it. But you asked about public perception, not government perception. Well, Secretary Clinton certainly ignited a firestorm when she complimented al-Jazeera's coverage of the Arab Spring, calling it "real news," in March. HuffPo article I don't have any concrete numbers, but there must be thousands of op-eds out there lambasting her for her endorsement of an "anti-American" network (I clicked on a Yahoo!news article thinking it would be pretty middle-of-the-road...not so much). So it seems to me that, while changing somewhat, there are still a lot of folks out there who see al-Jazeera as Osama bin--er, Ayman al-Zawahiri's personal megaphone. I know this study isn't perfect, but I think it's an interesting read nonetheless. Basically, the study had three groups. One was not shown a video clip, while the other two were shown exactly the same clip, except one had CNN logos and the other had al-Jazeera English (AJE). All three groups answered the same questions about trustworthiness, likelihood to watch, etc. Without going into numerical details (those can be found at the link above) AJE "was evaluated significantly less favorably" than CNN across the board. Additionally, participants who saw the video clip with CNN logos rated CNN more favorably than those who saw no clip, but AJE wasn't rated any higher by participants who saw the same clip.
The second part's going to have to wait until tomorrow. Ice cream calls. :-)
A Funny or "Funny" T-Shirt
Primitive Terrorist T-Shirt
I can't decide how I feel about this design. Is it serving to make fun of the stereotype of terrorists as beard-growing, kuffaiya-wearing yokels? Or promoting it?
I think the "primitive" part is rankling me particularly. Many Westerners view Middle Eastern cultures in general as "backward" or "primitive" in both a technological sense ("they don't have electricity, let alone the Internet") and an ideological sense ("they're inhuman savages--just look how they treat their women"). Technological determinism--the theory that technology has an inherent [assumed to be liberalizing] effect on societal values--is directly undermined by the fact that terrorists use the Internet just as much as reform-minded activists. Every terrorist group has a website, they all recruit online, etc. You can read more about this in Gary Bunt's iMuslims (the last two chapters) and Global Terrorism and New Media by Philip Seib and Dana Janbek, if you're interested and don't want to be trolling around on terrorist websites yourself.
I can't decide how I feel about this design. Is it serving to make fun of the stereotype of terrorists as beard-growing, kuffaiya-wearing yokels? Or promoting it?
I think the "primitive" part is rankling me particularly. Many Westerners view Middle Eastern cultures in general as "backward" or "primitive" in both a technological sense ("they don't have electricity, let alone the Internet") and an ideological sense ("they're inhuman savages--just look how they treat their women"). Technological determinism--the theory that technology has an inherent [assumed to be liberalizing] effect on societal values--is directly undermined by the fact that terrorists use the Internet just as much as reform-minded activists. Every terrorist group has a website, they all recruit online, etc. You can read more about this in Gary Bunt's iMuslims (the last two chapters) and Global Terrorism and New Media by Philip Seib and Dana Janbek, if you're interested and don't want to be trolling around on terrorist websites yourself.
Hamza al-Khateeb (Figures of Revolution Part 2)
Hamza al-Khateeb was a 13 year-old boy detained during a protest in Saida (near the now-infamous Deraa) on April 29th. According to his parents, they received his mutilated body nearly a month later, on May 24th. Government-run media has offered the explanation that what the parents call signs of torture are actually the natural effects of decomposition. Video taken of al-Khateeb's body made the rounds on the internet, and was met with outrage, to say the least. Some protesters see the torture and murder of a child as further evidence "that the secret police and the authorities are criminals who cannot be trusted to make any reforms." al-Jazeera English article (warning: possibly graphic image)
It remains to be seen if al-Khateeb's death will lead to more people protesting, but it has certainly galvanized those already taking to the streets.
I said yesterday that I feel like al-Khateeb is a stronger rallying point for Syrian protesters than Amina Abdullah. This is, in part, a matter of publicity and in part a matter of identity. Abdullah's blog was published in English, on Blogger. Internet users with Syrian IP addresses can't read blogs on Blogger (though they could post, as of the most recent Open Net Initiative testing). So accessing Abdullah's blog requires some amount of 'Net savvy to block one's IP address (the same ONI tests found about a third of anonymizer sites were also blocked), as well as English proficiency or expert-level decoding of Google Translate. Similarly, the Facebook page I found demanding her release was in English. Abdullah's possible American citizenship could also present something of a barrier to Syrians' affinity for her (not that Syrians don't like Americans, just that some might see the arrest of a Syrian-American as something different than that of a Syrian). Apart from her English-language blog, Abdullah remains an enigma--no (real) picture or video of her or even her family. MBC article (Arabic) complete with trolls in the comments
(MBC= Middle East Broadcasting Center, most well-known for its satellite TV channels. I can write a post about them sometime)
Contrast that with the graphic pictures and video of a dead ("martyred")* 13 year-old Syrian child splashed everywhere, along with the emotional displays of his devastated family. You do the math.
*(I know a little bit about martyrdom from my undergraduate honors' thesis. Another future post idea)
It remains to be seen if al-Khateeb's death will lead to more people protesting, but it has certainly galvanized those already taking to the streets.
I said yesterday that I feel like al-Khateeb is a stronger rallying point for Syrian protesters than Amina Abdullah. This is, in part, a matter of publicity and in part a matter of identity. Abdullah's blog was published in English, on Blogger. Internet users with Syrian IP addresses can't read blogs on Blogger (though they could post, as of the most recent Open Net Initiative testing). So accessing Abdullah's blog requires some amount of 'Net savvy to block one's IP address (the same ONI tests found about a third of anonymizer sites were also blocked), as well as English proficiency or expert-level decoding of Google Translate. Similarly, the Facebook page I found demanding her release was in English. Abdullah's possible American citizenship could also present something of a barrier to Syrians' affinity for her (not that Syrians don't like Americans, just that some might see the arrest of a Syrian-American as something different than that of a Syrian). Apart from her English-language blog, Abdullah remains an enigma--no (real) picture or video of her or even her family. MBC article (Arabic) complete with trolls in the comments
(MBC= Middle East Broadcasting Center, most well-known for its satellite TV channels. I can write a post about them sometime)
Contrast that with the graphic pictures and video of a dead ("martyred")* 13 year-old Syrian child splashed everywhere, along with the emotional displays of his devastated family. You do the math.
*(I know a little bit about martyrdom from my undergraduate honors' thesis. Another future post idea)
Wednesday, June 8, 2011
The Curious Case of Amina Abdullah (Figures of Revolution Part 1)
Amina Abdullah is a Syrian-American blogger who became a symbol of Syrian resistance on April 26th of this year, when she posted an entry reporting that security officers came to her home to arrest her for political content on her blog (A Gay Girl in Damascus). Her father, she said, was effectively able to shame the police into leaving without her. International news outlets quickly picked up the story, and it was celebrated as a defeat of the widespread political arrests taking place in Syria.
Then, a few days ago, a woman claiming to be Amina's cousin reported that Amina had been kidnapped while out and about in Damascus. This news also spread like wildfire. But this time there were questions brewing.
Some journalists have begun to question if Amina Abdullah even exists as she's presented on her blog. The main issues being raised are that journalists have been unable to find anyone who has actually met her in person, pictures supposedly of her were actually pulled from a London woman's Facebook, a report that her IP address was from the UK, and Amina's own words indicating her blog would be a mix of fact and fiction. Guardian article
There have been possible explanations offered for these inconsistencies. Some suggest that the writer of A Gay Girl in Damascus employed "Amina Abdullah" as a pseudonym, hid her real IP address and put up pictures of Jelena Lacic to maintain anonymity.
It's hard to come to a conclusion at this point. But since Amina Abdullah is purported to have American citizenship, the US State Department is investigating. Of course, even if the author of Amina's blog is an American detained in Syria, the Syrian government may or may not choose to cooperate. (Look no further than the high-profile detention of al-Jazeera correspondent Dorothy Parvaz, a naturalized Canadian citizen with an Iranian father and an American mother. The Syrian government simultaneously confirmed they were holding her for interrogation and claimed that she had been denied entry and returned to Qatar, when in reality she'd been deported to Iran within three days of her arrest) Parvaz's account of her ordeal
My feeling is if we don't hear anything more about Amina in the next 48 or 72 hours, she's disappeared into the cold embrace of the Syrian intelligence apparatus forever...if she ever existed in the first place. We may never know how true the accounts on the blog are. But if she's found out to be fake, what will that change?
I don't think it will make that much of a difference one way or the other. Why? Simply put, she's been upstaged by a 13 year-old boy named Hamza al-Khateeb. More on him (and why he is, in my opinion, a stronger rallying point for Syrians) next.
**Hat tip to my dear friend Jesko for reading my mind and inspiring this post**
Then, a few days ago, a woman claiming to be Amina's cousin reported that Amina had been kidnapped while out and about in Damascus. This news also spread like wildfire. But this time there were questions brewing.
Some journalists have begun to question if Amina Abdullah even exists as she's presented on her blog. The main issues being raised are that journalists have been unable to find anyone who has actually met her in person, pictures supposedly of her were actually pulled from a London woman's Facebook, a report that her IP address was from the UK, and Amina's own words indicating her blog would be a mix of fact and fiction. Guardian article
There have been possible explanations offered for these inconsistencies. Some suggest that the writer of A Gay Girl in Damascus employed "Amina Abdullah" as a pseudonym, hid her real IP address and put up pictures of Jelena Lacic to maintain anonymity.
It's hard to come to a conclusion at this point. But since Amina Abdullah is purported to have American citizenship, the US State Department is investigating. Of course, even if the author of Amina's blog is an American detained in Syria, the Syrian government may or may not choose to cooperate. (Look no further than the high-profile detention of al-Jazeera correspondent Dorothy Parvaz, a naturalized Canadian citizen with an Iranian father and an American mother. The Syrian government simultaneously confirmed they were holding her for interrogation and claimed that she had been denied entry and returned to Qatar, when in reality she'd been deported to Iran within three days of her arrest) Parvaz's account of her ordeal
My feeling is if we don't hear anything more about Amina in the next 48 or 72 hours, she's disappeared into the cold embrace of the Syrian intelligence apparatus forever...if she ever existed in the first place. We may never know how true the accounts on the blog are. But if she's found out to be fake, what will that change?
I don't think it will make that much of a difference one way or the other. Why? Simply put, she's been upstaged by a 13 year-old boy named Hamza al-Khateeb. More on him (and why he is, in my opinion, a stronger rallying point for Syrians) next.
**Hat tip to my dear friend Jesko for reading my mind and inspiring this post**
Syria in 2011
Serious protests broke out in Syria in March, despite President al-Assad's boasts about his country's immunity from civil unrest. The protesters demanded the lifting of the emergency law--in place since the 60s--that allowed for citizens to be arrested and held without charge indefinitely, permitted intelligence officials unrestricted powers of search and seizure, and criminalized public demonstrations. The emergency law was lifted on April 19th of this year, and al-Assad declared "peaceful demonstrations" would be legalized, but little has changed. By the Friday following al-Assad's declaration, security forces were firing on protesters again.
The government crackdown in Syria has fallen into a grotesque pattern. Flashpoint communities are surrounded by security forces, their phone, electricity, water, and internet lines are cut, and then the cities are shelled, sniped, and all but ransacked. In the case of Deraa, just a few miles from the border with Jordan, the border was sealed, further preventing escape. (More on Deraa in this Human Rights Watch Report) Throughout Syria, security forces have opened fire on protesters, prevented them from reaching medical care, and then blamed the violence on "armed gangs."
At this point, there is little reason to believe that Bashar al-Assad will allow any legitimate opposition to coalesce—be it physical or virtual, as continuing detentions of bloggers, activists, and foreign journalists illustrate. Furthermore, there is no incentive for al-Assad to accomodate reformists' demands. Events in Syria have shown that the regime in power remains consistent in its message that national unity and order must be upheld against the influences of disunion and chaos propagated by anti-regime sentiment. The possibility of chaos is a frightening specter to Syrians, who know about the upheaval of the 50’s and 60’s, and are all too aware of the simmering sectarian divisions within their society. This has led to significant pushback against reformists, who are seen as a danger to the tenuous unity of the country. As a reminder, in 1982, Hafez al-Assad’s forces killed up to 20,000 to quell a revolt, but he managed to stay in power.
International response has been pretty toothless. With NATO air strikes in Libya being received poorly on all sides, the UN narrowly passed a resolution that condemned the killing of peaceful protesters and called for an investigation of possible international law violations, but balked at additional action. That was at the end of April. There is another statement of condemnation in the works now, but again it doesn't contain any action, just words. al-Jazeera English article about the new UN resolution
Meanwhile, the situation on the ground continues to deteriorate. On Tuesday, the Syrian government vowed retaliation for the deaths of 120 security personnel near the town of Jisr al-Shugur in what they described as an ambush by armed gangs. A government newspaper indicated that a "military and security operation" would take place near Jisr al-Shugur because of information that "hundreds of gunmen" would be found there. al-Jazeera Arabic article on Jisr al-Shugur (the above al-Jazeera English article also talks about this, but I wanted to read it in Arabic for practice) This has caused many residents in the area to flee in a panic, even as some contend that the dead police were killed by the army for refusing to open fire on civilians.
Up next: individual victims as symbols and rallying points for protesters
The government crackdown in Syria has fallen into a grotesque pattern. Flashpoint communities are surrounded by security forces, their phone, electricity, water, and internet lines are cut, and then the cities are shelled, sniped, and all but ransacked. In the case of Deraa, just a few miles from the border with Jordan, the border was sealed, further preventing escape. (More on Deraa in this Human Rights Watch Report) Throughout Syria, security forces have opened fire on protesters, prevented them from reaching medical care, and then blamed the violence on "armed gangs."
At this point, there is little reason to believe that Bashar al-Assad will allow any legitimate opposition to coalesce—be it physical or virtual, as continuing detentions of bloggers, activists, and foreign journalists illustrate. Furthermore, there is no incentive for al-Assad to accomodate reformists' demands. Events in Syria have shown that the regime in power remains consistent in its message that national unity and order must be upheld against the influences of disunion and chaos propagated by anti-regime sentiment. The possibility of chaos is a frightening specter to Syrians, who know about the upheaval of the 50’s and 60’s, and are all too aware of the simmering sectarian divisions within their society. This has led to significant pushback against reformists, who are seen as a danger to the tenuous unity of the country. As a reminder, in 1982, Hafez al-Assad’s forces killed up to 20,000 to quell a revolt, but he managed to stay in power.
International response has been pretty toothless. With NATO air strikes in Libya being received poorly on all sides, the UN narrowly passed a resolution that condemned the killing of peaceful protesters and called for an investigation of possible international law violations, but balked at additional action. That was at the end of April. There is another statement of condemnation in the works now, but again it doesn't contain any action, just words. al-Jazeera English article about the new UN resolution
Meanwhile, the situation on the ground continues to deteriorate. On Tuesday, the Syrian government vowed retaliation for the deaths of 120 security personnel near the town of Jisr al-Shugur in what they described as an ambush by armed gangs. A government newspaper indicated that a "military and security operation" would take place near Jisr al-Shugur because of information that "hundreds of gunmen" would be found there. al-Jazeera Arabic article on Jisr al-Shugur (the above al-Jazeera English article also talks about this, but I wanted to read it in Arabic for practice) This has caused many residents in the area to flee in a panic, even as some contend that the dead police were killed by the army for refusing to open fire on civilians.
Up next: individual victims as symbols and rallying points for protesters
Syria Background
Bashar al-Assad’s father, Hafez, ruled Syria for nearly thirty years, from February of 1971 until his death in June of 2000. Under Hafez al-Assad, Syria enjoyed a respite from the series of coups that plagued the country in the ‘50s and ‘60s. This seeming tranquility was largely due to the elder al-Assad’s expansion of the state’s intelligence apparatus and brutal crackdown on political dissent. The most infamous example of this was in 1982. A revolt in the west-central city of Hama, led by the Muslim Brotherhood, was brutally crushed, resulting in the massacre of some 20,000 Syrians. Hafez al-Assad had been priming his elder son, Basil, to succeed him. Basil’s unexpected death in a car accident in 1994 put flight to that notion. Bashar al-Assad was promptly called back to Syria from England, where he had been studying ophthalmology, to take up his brother’s mantle. Six years later, Hafez al-Assad succumbed to a heart attack, and the one-time eye doctor found himself as ruler of Syria. Bashar Profile from the BBC
The fact that Bashar al-Assad was partially Western educated and had married a Englishwoman of Syrian origin, coupled with his closure of Mazzeh prison—home to thousands of political prisoners—and provocative speeches calling for “constructive criticism” and “democracy,” fueled hopes the Bashar al-Assad might break from his father’s policies and institute unprecedented reforms. He also legalized the Internet and commenced the development of the necessary infrastructure to support it within months of succeeding his father, as part of the so-called “Damascus Spring.”
After roughly a year of this “season,” in which reformist voices were offered a moderate opportunity to organize and promulgate their views, through forum-style gatherings and written declarations, the door to change inexplicably slammed shut. Mediums for dissent were closed and outlawed, and political imprisonments started up again. What happened? Farid Ghadry posits, “Many Syrian intellectuals argue today that the Damascus Spring was a trap” to identify and neutralize any possible threats to the latest Baath regime (“Syrian Reform: What Lies Beneath.” Middle East Quarterly. 12.1 (2005) : pp. 61-70. ).
The fact that Bashar al-Assad was partially Western educated and had married a Englishwoman of Syrian origin, coupled with his closure of Mazzeh prison—home to thousands of political prisoners—and provocative speeches calling for “constructive criticism” and “democracy,” fueled hopes the Bashar al-Assad might break from his father’s policies and institute unprecedented reforms. He also legalized the Internet and commenced the development of the necessary infrastructure to support it within months of succeeding his father, as part of the so-called “Damascus Spring.”
After roughly a year of this “season,” in which reformist voices were offered a moderate opportunity to organize and promulgate their views, through forum-style gatherings and written declarations, the door to change inexplicably slammed shut. Mediums for dissent were closed and outlawed, and political imprisonments started up again. What happened? Farid Ghadry posits, “Many Syrian intellectuals argue today that the Damascus Spring was a trap” to identify and neutralize any possible threats to the latest Baath regime (“Syrian Reform: What Lies Beneath.” Middle East Quarterly. 12.1 (2005) : pp. 61-70. ).
Syria is a complex country, ethnically and religiously, with Kurds, Sunnis, Shiites, Alawites, Christians, Druze, Assyrians, Armenians, Circassians, and Arabs comprising the largest groups. The country's relationships with Lebanon and Iran are important, but the subject for another post.
Thank goodness I just wrote a paper on Syria this past semester, or that would have taken a while. :-)
Up next: Syria this year
Tuesday, June 7, 2011
A word on sources
Once I get past these overviewish posts, I'll be responding to specific articles or other publications, so I'll have a link to what I'm referring (to...? how do you not end that sentence with a dangling preposition?). In the meantime, I did want to let you know that I'm not completely making stuff up or cutting and pasting from Wikipedia. My standby reference for historical context is A History of the Modern Middle East by William Cleveland. I use the third edition, although a fourth came out in 2008. It's not exactly light reading, because it's so densely packed with information, but the writing style is reader-friendly. I have been known to read a chapter or two nightly before bed as a refresher every now and then.
Another reference I keep on hand especially for delving into the Arab-Israeli conflict is a packet of documents a college professor of mine (Dr. Ken Stein) assembled. It includes the full text of relevant UN resolutions, maps, and all sorts of other goodies. It lost its cover long ago, but that just adds character, right?
For news stories, I used to have to check about a zillion different websites daily. Now I pretty much just check my Twitter feed and see what al-Jazeera English, al-Jazeera Arabic, the various US embassies in the Middle East, PJ Crowley, the Brookings Institution, the White House, Human Rights Watch, etc. have to say, all in one stop. Occasionally I also use Library Press Display to take a gander a more locally focused newspapers (I get a kick out of the advertisements, among other things), or watch Youtube videos if I haven't had enough nightmares recently.
As an aside, it has been interesting over the past few months to see al-Jazeera somewhat drawn into the fold of international media. During the Iraq War, al-Jazeera was smeared as an al-Qaeda instrument, a perception that continues to this day in some camps. Interestingly, al-Jazeera has also been denounced as a Zionist entity, so you figure that one out. I could write an entire post about al-Jazeera, and probably will at some point. For now, I will say only that I find it (in whatever language) a useful source of information.
And, of course, my trusty Hans Wehr Arabic-English dictionary is never far from my side. Although somebody really should update it and take "هتلر" (a verb form of Hitler) out, and if I'm feeling lazy or can't find something in Hans, I use Google translate. Don't hate.
Another reference I keep on hand especially for delving into the Arab-Israeli conflict is a packet of documents a college professor of mine (Dr. Ken Stein) assembled. It includes the full text of relevant UN resolutions, maps, and all sorts of other goodies. It lost its cover long ago, but that just adds character, right?
For news stories, I used to have to check about a zillion different websites daily. Now I pretty much just check my Twitter feed and see what al-Jazeera English, al-Jazeera Arabic, the various US embassies in the Middle East, PJ Crowley, the Brookings Institution, the White House, Human Rights Watch, etc. have to say, all in one stop. Occasionally I also use Library Press Display to take a gander a more locally focused newspapers (I get a kick out of the advertisements, among other things), or watch Youtube videos if I haven't had enough nightmares recently.
As an aside, it has been interesting over the past few months to see al-Jazeera somewhat drawn into the fold of international media. During the Iraq War, al-Jazeera was smeared as an al-Qaeda instrument, a perception that continues to this day in some camps. Interestingly, al-Jazeera has also been denounced as a Zionist entity, so you figure that one out. I could write an entire post about al-Jazeera, and probably will at some point. For now, I will say only that I find it (in whatever language) a useful source of information.
And, of course, my trusty Hans Wehr Arabic-English dictionary is never far from my side. Although somebody really should update it and take "هتلر" (a verb form of Hitler) out, and if I'm feeling lazy or can't find something in Hans, I use Google translate. Don't hate.
What's Up in Yemen?
Protests erupted in Yemen early this year. Yemenis' grievances include abject poverty, dwindling oil and water supplies, widespread government corruption, intolerance of dissent, and Saleh's acceptance of US drone strikes on Yemeni targets. Saleh offered to step down at the end of his current term (2013) but has repeatedly reneged on an agreement brokered by the GCC* under which he'd resign and abdicate power within 30 days in exchange for immunity from charges related to corruption and deaths of protesters over the past four months.
Saleh has insisted that he will not allow Yemen to become a "failed state." This, despite the fact that armed gunmen have taken over the coastal city of Zanjibar and there are reports of all-out warfare in the streets of Taiz (south) and the capital of Sanaa'. Not to mention the fact that the royal palace got blown up, severely injuring the president. Crowds cheered in the streets after news circulated that Saleh had been flown to Saudi Arabia to seek treatment for his wounds. Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, the vice president originally from the South, is now Yemeni acting president. Huge crowds continue to mass in Yemen to demand the formation of an interim government--without Saleh, any of his sons, or Hadi. The current international speculation is on whether Saleh will attempt to return to continue his rule following treatment of his injuries or stay in exile in Saudi Arabia. There have also been hints that Saleh's injuries may be much more severe than initially reported. BBC Article
US Concerns and Response. Saleh has repeatedly warned that his departure would be a victory for radical Islamists--specifically al-Qaeda. Opposition leaders have dismissed that claim as fear-mongering. The White House has expressed its support for the GCC proposal. As fighting intensifies, it seems the US officials have come to the conclusion that Saleh's presence offers no more of a deterrent for potential terrorist activity than his absence.
Summary. There are still deep divisions between North and South. When the two sides reunified in 1990, the majority of citizens on both sides supported it. That may not be the case any longer. If Saleh does remain in Saudi Arabia (or succumbs to his wounds), whoever assumes the mantle of control will inherit a lot of "opportunities." He (I'm assuming it'll be a he) will have to deal with Saleh loyalists, Northern opposition groups, Southern separatists who want their own country back, clansmen who don't really want to have to answer to anyone but themselves, and Islamists who certainly have their own agenda. The US will be looking to throw its support behind someone who can maintain control over all of these groups, and crack down harshly on any radical elements. I don't have any clue who that might be at this point. Suggestions?
*GCC- Gulf Cooperation Countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE
Saleh has insisted that he will not allow Yemen to become a "failed state." This, despite the fact that armed gunmen have taken over the coastal city of Zanjibar and there are reports of all-out warfare in the streets of Taiz (south) and the capital of Sanaa'. Not to mention the fact that the royal palace got blown up, severely injuring the president. Crowds cheered in the streets after news circulated that Saleh had been flown to Saudi Arabia to seek treatment for his wounds. Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, the vice president originally from the South, is now Yemeni acting president. Huge crowds continue to mass in Yemen to demand the formation of an interim government--without Saleh, any of his sons, or Hadi. The current international speculation is on whether Saleh will attempt to return to continue his rule following treatment of his injuries or stay in exile in Saudi Arabia. There have also been hints that Saleh's injuries may be much more severe than initially reported. BBC Article
US Concerns and Response. Saleh has repeatedly warned that his departure would be a victory for radical Islamists--specifically al-Qaeda. Opposition leaders have dismissed that claim as fear-mongering. The White House has expressed its support for the GCC proposal. As fighting intensifies, it seems the US officials have come to the conclusion that Saleh's presence offers no more of a deterrent for potential terrorist activity than his absence.
Summary. There are still deep divisions between North and South. When the two sides reunified in 1990, the majority of citizens on both sides supported it. That may not be the case any longer. If Saleh does remain in Saudi Arabia (or succumbs to his wounds), whoever assumes the mantle of control will inherit a lot of "opportunities." He (I'm assuming it'll be a he) will have to deal with Saleh loyalists, Northern opposition groups, Southern separatists who want their own country back, clansmen who don't really want to have to answer to anyone but themselves, and Islamists who certainly have their own agenda. The US will be looking to throw its support behind someone who can maintain control over all of these groups, and crack down harshly on any radical elements. I don't have any clue who that might be at this point. Suggestions?
*GCC- Gulf Cooperation Countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE
Yemen: A History Lesson
I don't think it's necessary to go back to time immemorial to understand what's going on in Yemen, although that seems to be a common trope in Middle East conflicts. Instead, let's go back to the 1960s. The division of Yemen goes back further, but that's ok. North Yemen became a monarchy after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, and South Yemen had for some time been controlled with varying degrees of intensity by the British, whose primary interest was keeping hold of the Port of Aden. In 1962, Imam Muhammad al-Badr, the leader of North Yemen, was deposed by Nasser*-inspired pan-Arabists. He didn't go quietly, however, and a civil war broke out and continued until a ceasefire in 1970, with Imam Muhammad receiving Saudi support to regain his throne, while the rebels had Egyptian backing.
By this time, the heat in South Yemen was becoming too much for the British, as violence stemming from anti-imperialist sentiment spilled over from the North. In 1967, the British left and the People's Democratic Republic of South Yemen declared both its independence and its desire to wipe all monarchies off the map of the Arabian Peninsula. Saudi Arabia, a monarchy ruled at that time by King Faysal (or Faisal), found itself facing two Yemens vehemently against monarchical rule: the North characterized by pan-Arab republican ideology, and the South dominated by Marxism. As early as 1972, reunification of North and South Yemen was anticipated, although no agreement was reached until 1979, and it was never implemented as planned, largely due to Saudi efforts to drive wedges by offering economic carrots to the North. A dude named Ali Abdullah Saleh became leader of North Yemen in 1978 following the assassination of his predecessor.
North and South Yemen continued on-again, off-again reunification negotiations until 1990, when they finally unified officially, under Saleh. Unfortunately, this coincided with the first Gulf War. Yemen's neutrality in the conflict brought on Saudi Arabia's wrath. In response to Yemen's refusal to send troops or condemn Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbors expelled nearly a million Yemeni expatriate workers (7% of the Yemen's total population). The combined stresses of reunification, the sudden influx of expelled workers, and growing feelings of exploitation in the oil-rich South were ultimately sufficient to start a civil war between North and South in 1994. The North emerged victorious in a matter of months; however, tensions never eased. Since the mid-90s, the national government has struggled to keep control over separatist and tribal factions in the South--or really anywhere outside the capital city of Sanaa'.
Up next: the past four months in Yemen.
*Gamal Abdel Nasser- president of Egypt from 1956-1970. Famous for his nationalization of the Suez Canal and his anti-imperialist, pan-Arabist (or Arab nationalist) philosophy.
By this time, the heat in South Yemen was becoming too much for the British, as violence stemming from anti-imperialist sentiment spilled over from the North. In 1967, the British left and the People's Democratic Republic of South Yemen declared both its independence and its desire to wipe all monarchies off the map of the Arabian Peninsula. Saudi Arabia, a monarchy ruled at that time by King Faysal (or Faisal), found itself facing two Yemens vehemently against monarchical rule: the North characterized by pan-Arab republican ideology, and the South dominated by Marxism. As early as 1972, reunification of North and South Yemen was anticipated, although no agreement was reached until 1979, and it was never implemented as planned, largely due to Saudi efforts to drive wedges by offering economic carrots to the North. A dude named Ali Abdullah Saleh became leader of North Yemen in 1978 following the assassination of his predecessor.
North and South Yemen continued on-again, off-again reunification negotiations until 1990, when they finally unified officially, under Saleh. Unfortunately, this coincided with the first Gulf War. Yemen's neutrality in the conflict brought on Saudi Arabia's wrath. In response to Yemen's refusal to send troops or condemn Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbors expelled nearly a million Yemeni expatriate workers (7% of the Yemen's total population). The combined stresses of reunification, the sudden influx of expelled workers, and growing feelings of exploitation in the oil-rich South were ultimately sufficient to start a civil war between North and South in 1994. The North emerged victorious in a matter of months; however, tensions never eased. Since the mid-90s, the national government has struggled to keep control over separatist and tribal factions in the South--or really anywhere outside the capital city of Sanaa'.
Up next: the past four months in Yemen.
*Gamal Abdel Nasser- president of Egypt from 1956-1970. Famous for his nationalization of the Suez Canal and his anti-imperialist, pan-Arabist (or Arab nationalist) philosophy.
By way of explanation
My super-awesome (and paid) internship plans for this summer fell by the wayside, and it's looking more and more like I'll be relying on temp office work and manual labor (?!) to keep me in ramen noodles and ethnic textiles for the Bailey House living room come fall. So in the interest of keeping my Arabic skills sharp and the ol' wheels in the brain turning, I'll be posting (probably far too much) about the same types of things I would've been grappling with in my internship.
If you've been living under a rock, you may have missed the revolutionary fervor sweeping through the Middle East and North Africa since the beginning of the year. Already dictators have fallen in Tunisia and Egypt (possibly Yemen, more on that later today), and violent demonstrations continue in Syria and Libya. My boss at the golf course used to insist we say "opportunity" instead of "problem" (i.e. "We have an opportunity: the scoreboard fell on Becky and I can't get it off of her"). So, in that spirit, these regime changes and potential regime changes present the US and our allies with many "opportunities." Among these are the fact that the US supported many of these deposed dictators for years (gee, how embarrassing), and that some fear militant Islamist groups may rocket to power as the regimes that have kept them in check fall.
I hope to examine these and more "opportunities" in the future. This is, of course from the perspective of American political interests. But I also think it's important to look at the events in the Middle East from the perspective of the people who live there--with their history, culture, and aspirations in mind. I have often been led to wonder if it's possible to fashion US foreign policy such that both American and local interests are served, or if the two are hopelessly at odds. If interests are at odds, does our government have the right or responsibility to put our needs above the rights of the local populace? (For example, is it right for our government to lobby to keep a corrupt autocrat in power because we feel we can trust him to undermine Islamist goals, even though the regime might be trampling on the rights of its citizens?)
Finally, a few disclaimers. As much as I'd like to elevate myself, I'm still a student. I'm going to make mistakes, and I welcome (polite) correction. I am also aware that I can't possibly keep apace of everything going on in every Middle Eastern country. I will likely focus most on Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinian territories, because that is where my personal interests lie, although Yemen and Egypt will probably also figure prominently. Similarly, the bulk of my foreign policy analysis will revolve around US foreign policy, although Germany has been getting itself a few headlines recently, and some other NATO allies will no doubt make an appearance. Lastly, I am aware of my own bias and those of (most) of my sources. Again, constructive criticisms or corrections are welcome.
Phew!
If you've been living under a rock, you may have missed the revolutionary fervor sweeping through the Middle East and North Africa since the beginning of the year. Already dictators have fallen in Tunisia and Egypt (possibly Yemen, more on that later today), and violent demonstrations continue in Syria and Libya. My boss at the golf course used to insist we say "opportunity" instead of "problem" (i.e. "We have an opportunity: the scoreboard fell on Becky and I can't get it off of her"). So, in that spirit, these regime changes and potential regime changes present the US and our allies with many "opportunities." Among these are the fact that the US supported many of these deposed dictators for years (gee, how embarrassing), and that some fear militant Islamist groups may rocket to power as the regimes that have kept them in check fall.
I hope to examine these and more "opportunities" in the future. This is, of course from the perspective of American political interests. But I also think it's important to look at the events in the Middle East from the perspective of the people who live there--with their history, culture, and aspirations in mind. I have often been led to wonder if it's possible to fashion US foreign policy such that both American and local interests are served, or if the two are hopelessly at odds. If interests are at odds, does our government have the right or responsibility to put our needs above the rights of the local populace? (For example, is it right for our government to lobby to keep a corrupt autocrat in power because we feel we can trust him to undermine Islamist goals, even though the regime might be trampling on the rights of its citizens?)
Finally, a few disclaimers. As much as I'd like to elevate myself, I'm still a student. I'm going to make mistakes, and I welcome (polite) correction. I am also aware that I can't possibly keep apace of everything going on in every Middle Eastern country. I will likely focus most on Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinian territories, because that is where my personal interests lie, although Yemen and Egypt will probably also figure prominently. Similarly, the bulk of my foreign policy analysis will revolve around US foreign policy, although Germany has been getting itself a few headlines recently, and some other NATO allies will no doubt make an appearance. Lastly, I am aware of my own bias and those of (most) of my sources. Again, constructive criticisms or corrections are welcome.
Phew!
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